We study the evolutionary success of a generalised trigger strategy within an asymmetric, n-player Prisoner's Dilemma environment, with application to the evolution of cooperation in international environmental negotiations. Our results suggest that there exist regions in the relevant parameter space -i.e. costs and bene…ts, low and high titfor-tat thresholds, probability of continued interaction -such that (partial) cooperation may emerge as long-run attractor of the evolutionary dynamics in these asymmetric social dilemmas.
Introduction
The history of the Kyoto Protocol has shown how di¢ cult it is to maintain and implement International Environmental Agreements, with the purpose to internalize transboundary externalities such as climate change. A tragedy of the commons occurs whenever there exist a wedge between individually and collectively rational actions. The literature has mainly focused on the stability properties of a coalition in a two-stage non-cooperative game and has shown that free-rider incentives dominate incentives to cooperate, so that stable coalitions are small (Barrett (1994) , Finus (2003) ). When countries di¤er in their costs and bene…ts of emission reductions (or abatement), the stable coalition can be larger but total abatement remains low as compared to the full-cooperative outcome (McGinty (2007) , Fuentes-Albero and Rubio (2010), Pavlova and de Zeeuw (2013) ).
The history of the Kyoto Protocol has also shown that countries stop believing that a general agreement on emission reductions can be achieved and start searching for alternatives.
For example, some countries that did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol at some stage suggested to focus on technology development instead. If the technological progress becomes generally available, technology agreements may indeed improve the situation but the full-cooperative outcome is not guaranteed (e.g. Hoel and de Zeeuw (2013) ). Leadership may be another option. The idea is that some countries start with emission reductions and other countries follow. One may say that the Kyoto protocol was saved for some time by the European Union trying to take up a leadership role. Furthermore, at the Conference of the Parties (COP 15) in Copenhagen in 2009 a few other countries took the lead with the idea to build emission reductions bottom up, instead of top down via an unanimously agreed upon plan. To take this one step further, reciprocity may be the answer. The folk theorem in game theory says that players can keep each other on a cooperative path by starting with cooperation and using trigger strategies that su¢ ciently punish deviations. In a world with di¤erent strategies, the question is whether this type of strategies can survive and induce cooperation.
Various mechanisms have been proposed in the literature to deal with social dilemmas focusing on direct or indirect reciprocity through rewards or punishments and on spatial or local interaction (Nowak and Sigmund (2006) ). In particular, conditional trigger strategies in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games have been shown to be e¤ective in overcoming the typical gloomy picture of perpetual deviations. Models on the evolution of simple behavioral rules in pairwise interactions with symmetric payo¤ structures show that cooperative behavior can be generated. However, this theoretical framework has its limitations as social dilemmas are rarely two-person games and asymmetries in payo¤s are ubiquitous. The international game of emission reductions usually is a Prisoners's Dilemma game but it has many players and the payo¤s to the countries are clearly asymmetric. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the evolution of "tit-for-tat" strategies in a world that also contains strategies that always defect, and to show in which situation cooperation will be generated.
Our paper is related to a paper by Boyd and Richerson (1988) . Their basic model is similar to a typical model in the literature on International Environmental Agreements. It has n players but it assumes symmetry. In our model the countries that interact are randomly drawn from a population with two types of countries that di¤er in their costs and bene…ts of emission reductions. Following Boyd and Richerson (1988) we have two possible strategies: always defect and a "tit-for-tat" strategy that starts cooperating and continues cooperating if su¢ ciently many countries in the interacting group cooperate. Since we have asymmetry, in our model the trigger strategies of the two types may di¤er. The dynamical evolution is described by replicator dynamics: if a strategy is successful in the interacting group, the share of this strategy in the population increases. We will show that the parameter space has areas where full-cooperation will result and areas where no cooperation will result. We will show that su¢ ciently high initial fractions of "tit-for-tat" strategies, su¢ ciently high thresholds in the trigger strategies and a su¢ ciently high probability of continued interaction induces full cooperation at the end of the process.
Other papers have studied the symmetric n-player repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game as well. Diekmann and Manhart (1989) show with simulations that the "tit-for-tat" strategy could be relatively successful, even in large groups. Molander (1992) …nds that a generalized reciprocity rule may co-exist with defectors in the limit set of the evolutionary dynamics. Lindgren and Johanson (2002) run a simulation study of Boyd and Richerson (1988) and Molander (1992) , using …nite automata, and suggest that strategies with memory two or higher (i.e. conditioning on two or more past moves of the opponents) could escape the defection …xed points. Rieskamp and Todd (2006) study the role of asymmetric payo¤s in a two-player repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game and show, via simulations, that the three bestperforming strategies di¤er from the best-performing strategy in a symmetric set-up. On the methodological side, our contribution is the analysis of an asymmetric n-player repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game.
Other papers have studied International Environmental Agreements from an evolutionary game perspective as well. Breton et al. (2010) analyze a game with stock externalities and assume that each signatory has to punish non-signatories for their irresponsible behavior.
Countries become asymmetric because the costs of punishing and the costs of being punished di¤er. Replicator dynamics favors the successful strategy and leads to an equilibrium share of signatories that depends on the parameters of the problem. McGinty (2010) analyses a standard game of International Environmental Agreements but assumes that the marginal bene…t of total abatement di¤ers between signatories and non-signatories, with possibly different types as well. The evolutionary equilibrium determines the size of the coalition and depends on whether the basic game becomes a Prisoner's Dilemma, a Coordination Game or a Hawk-Dove Game. Our contribution is the study of the evolution of reciprocity, in the form of "tit-for-tat" strategies, in the international game of emission reductions as an asymmetric n-player Prisoner's Dilemma. 
The model
International Environmental Agreements are usually modeled as a two-stage game where in the …rst stage countries decide whether they want to sign the agreement or not and where in the second stage the emission reductions are decided in a game between the coalition of signatories and the individual outsiders (Barrett (1994) , Finus (2003) ). The (symmetric) n countries have the discrete choice to abate or not and have costs c of their own abatement and bene…ts of total abatement. If all the countries abate, the (maximal) bene…ts are B for each country. Individually each country generates bene…ts B=n and if c > B=n, it is not individually rational to abate. However, if B > c, it is collectively rational to abate.
Moreover, if iB=n > c, it is rational for the group of i countries to abate. The smallest i for which this holds is the size of the stable coalition: if the coalition gets smaller, it has no reason to form, and adding another country to the coalition decreases the net bene…ts of the group. This implies that only the fraction (i=n) of maximal bene…ts B, that just covers the cost c, is realized with the stable coalition and this is usually not a very good result.
Therefore we investigate whether it is possible to achieve maximal bene…ts or full cooperation when countries change their strategies and do not try to reach an agreement. Instead we investigate the option that part of the population of countries adopts a "tit-for-tat" strategy starting with cooperation or abatement and continuing with cooperation if su¢ ciently many other countries cooperate. The other countries in the population do not abate or defect.
However, if the "tit-for-tat" strategy is successful, other countries adopt this strategy as well and in this process "tit-for-tat" strategies may be attractors and at the end full cooperation may be achieved. In this analysis it is assumed that in each period of time only part of the population interacts and plays a repeated game with some probability of continuation. After the repeated game ends, the distribution of the strategies in the population is adjusted and the process continues with a new random draw of a part of the population. We will build the model in steps.
Prisoner' s Dilemma
The basic game with two countries is a standard Prisoner's Dilemma (where C denotes cooperation or abatement and D denotes defection or no abatement) that can be represented by a bi-matrix where the …rst entries are the net bene…ts of country 1 and the second entries are the net bene…ts of country 2: An n-player Prisoner's Dilemma (e.g. Taylor (1976 ), Schelling (1978 ) is speci…ed as follows. Let V (C j i) and V (D j i) denote the individual payo¤s if i of the n players cooperate.
These payo¤s should have the following properties:
which means that defection D is the dominant action,
; i = 0; 1; :::; n 1;
which means that if a player switches from defection to cooperation, every other player is better o¤, and
which means that the average payo¤ (or …tness) increases if one player switches from defection to cooperation.
If n = 2 these properties generate a slightly stronger form of the Prisoner's Dilemma than usual for two players because they also require that the o¤-diagonal average payo¤ is higher than the payo¤ in the Nash equilibrium. In any case, for the n-country game of emission reductions it holds that V (C j i) = iB=n c and V (D j i) = iB=n and the assumptions in the text above imply that iB=n > (i + 1)B=n c; (i + 1)B=n > iB=n and
that the three properties hold. This model is precisely the basic model in Boyd and Richerson (1988) .
Since the countries are asymmetric in their costs and bene…ts of emission reductions,
we introduce an asymmetry into the basic model. We assume that there are two types in respectively, that cooperate, the net bene…ts for country i of type I are
and the net bene…ts of country j of type J are
The game is played as follows. In each period of time, n=2 (n even) countries are drawn randomly from each population, according to the binomial distribution. These countries play a repeated n-player asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma, with the game above as the stage game.
The game continues with probability 0 < w < 1. After the repeated game ends, the fractions of type I and J in the total population are adjusted with replicator dynamics which we will describe below. First we attend to the possible strategies in the repeated game.
Asymmetric trigger strategies
The countries can have one of two strategies: always defect (no abatement) or a trigger strategy. For the case of two countries, a trigger strategy conditions the action of a country on the action(s) of the other country. The "tit-for-tat" strategy prescribes that a country starts cooperating and cooperates if the other country has cooperated one step earlier and defects if the other country has defected one step earlier. For the case of n (symmetric) countries, Taylor (1976) introduced a generalization of "tit-for-tat" prescribing that a country cooperates if or more of the other countries have cooperated one step earlier and otherwise defects. Note that this is a set of strategies since can take values 1; :::; n 1. Because of the asymmetry between the countries, we generalize this set of strategies further and introduce asymmetric "tit-for-tat" strategies for conditional cooperation as follows. If i and j are countries of type I and J, respectively, we de…ne the "tit-for-tat" strategies T F T by:
T F T : "start with C j and choose C j if at least 2 type I and 2 type J countries cooperated in the previous round, otherwise choose D j ".
The thresholds f 1 ; 1 ; 2 ; 2 g re ‡ect the stringency of the reciprocative rules. The ordering of the thresholds f 1 ; 1 ; 2 ; 2 g yields four cases:
In the sequel we focus on case (i) because it seems reasonable to assume that the countries of type I (Annex I) are willing to cooperate in a less cooperative environment than the countries of type J (Annex II). The analysis of the other cases is similar but since the analysis is tedious we will not include the other cases in this paper.
If the random draw yields k countries of type I and l countries of type J that use the trigger strategy, Figure 1 shows the paths of actions of these countries for the di¤erent positions of k and l with respect to the thresholds f 1 ; 1 ; 2 ; 2 g. There are three possible outcomes. In the upper right corner (denoted by 1) there is full cooperation. In the square in the middle, plus the squares to the right and above the middle one (denoted by 2), countries of type I always cooperate but countries of type J switch to defection after the …rst step. In the other squares (denoted by 3) all countries switch to defection after the …rst step.
Replicator Dynamics
The countries in both parts of the population can have one of two strategies: always defect (no abatement), denoted by AllD i ; AllD j , or the trigger strategy, denoted by T F T
We will refer to countries using the trigger strategy as reciprocators. The idea of replicator dynamics is that countries may switch to the other strategy if it proves to be better, which is re ‡ected by the total net bene…ts that the two strategies achieve in the interaction.
It captures the idea that strategies that fare better than the average tend to spread in the population. Replicator dynamics models the evolution of the fractions of the trigger strategies
in the two populations I; J: Let ( 1 ; 2 ) denote the shares of reciprocators in the two populations I; J, respectively. Formally, replicator dynamics is given by:
Note that the di¤erences in net bene…ts between the reciprocative strategy and unconditional defection fully determines the dynamics of the replicator equations so that we only need to compute the payo¤ di¤erentials i and j in order to characterize the attracting set of this system.
The replicator dynamics (6), (7) has steady states on the boundary, that is ( 1 ; 2 ) 2 f(0; 0); (0; 1); (1; 0); (1; 1)g, or in the interior, that is 0 < 1 ; 2 < 1, at zeros of the following system: 2 6 4 i = 0
Summarizing, the game is played as follows:
(i) n=2 countries are randomly drawn from each population I; J and matched to play a repeated n-player asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma In Appendix A we compute the expected payo¤ di¤erentials. The dynamics of the evolutionary system are fully described by the replicator dynamics (6), (7) and the payo¤ differentials (12), (13) of the trigger strategies T F T i 1 ; 1 and T F T j 2 ; 2 over the unconditional defection strategies. The system in 1 and 2 is highly non-linear and is very di¢ cult to solve explicitly for a general parameterization. Therefore we will present a numerical analysis in the next section.
Numerical results
We will focus the analysis on the extreme cases where reciprocal countries either cooperate irrespective of the number of cooperators they are matched with or where they require all countries of one or both types to cooperate in the previous stage. We distinguish the following cases:
(a) 1 = 1 = 2 = 2 = 0: both types I; J cooperate irrespective of the number of cooperators they are matched with,
1: type I is very accommodative, whereas type J is very restrictive, (c) 1 = 2 = n 2 1; 1 = 2 = 0: both types I; J care only about type I's cooperation,
1: both types I; J are very restrictive (these are the T F T strategies used in Boyd and Richerson (1988) but now with asymmetries).
Notice that not all possible orderings can be investigated as the speci…c evolutionary dynamics are derived for the particular threshold ordering f 1 2 ; 1 2 g. Given the complicated, non-linear structure of the dynamical system (6)- (7) we only report numerical results for these con…gurations of thresholds. The benchmark model parameterization is: n = 20; B = 40; b = 30; c h = 3; c l = 2 and w = 0:8. We will investigate the sensitivity for these benchmark parameter values later.
Cases (a), (b), (c) and (d)
(a) 1 = 1 = 2 = 2 = 0: Both type I and type J countries cooperate irrespective of the other countries' abatement decision. As can be seen in Figure 2a , most of the initial conditions are attracted to the (0; 1) equilibrium with type J countries switching to the reciprocal strategy T F T while type I countries end up as unconditional defectors with strategy
AllD. In this case, at the end of the evolutionary process, type J countries keep each other on the cooperative path, whereas type I countries just free-ride on the e¤orts of type J countries. 1 seems to be the most promising avenue for inducing cooperation within the asymmetric n-player repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. In the sequel, we will investigate its robustness with respect to some key benchmark parameters.
Sensitivity to benchmark parameters
First we look at the number of countries n and the probability of an additional round in the repeated game w. As can be seen in Figure 4a , increasing the number of countries n worsens the social dilemma, in case of very restrictive thresholds ( 1 = 2 = 9; 1 = 2 = 9).
Whereas for a relatively small number of participants (n = 20) reciprocity evolves in the two populations, for larger n at some point unconditional defectors take over. As can be seen in Figure 4b , decreasing the probability of an additional round in the repeated game w has a similar e¤ect. For w larger than 0:8, reciprocity evolves in the two populations but for a smaller w the system moves away towards partially cooperative states. It follows that the group should not be too large and should interact su¢ ciently many times in order to increase reciprocity in the two populations. . We start with the initial fractions ( 1 ; 2 ) of reciprocators (0:75; 0:75), 1 A similar sensitivity test can be performed with respect to type J triggers ( 2 ; 2 ) but with fewer degrees of freedom, given the constraint on thresholds 1 2 ; 1 2 which e¤ectively restricts 2 2 [ 1 ;
increase 1 2 f5; 7; 8; 9g and 1 2 f6; 7; 8; 9g, and keep the remaining parameters at n = 20; 2 = 9; 2 = 9; B = 40; b = 30; c h = 3; c l = 2 and w = 0:8. As can be seen in Figure   5ab , unless the reciprocal strategy T F T
conditions on all other countries cooperating (i.e. 1 = 9 and 1 = 9) the evolutionary dynamics with asymmetric countries cannot sustain cooperation. However, we have seen that a high probability of continued interaction w improves cooperation. Indeed, as can be seen in Figure 5cd , for a high probability (w = 0:95) the emergence of reciprocators in both populations occurs for lower thresholds ( 1 < Our theoretical framework and its ensuing numerical analysis allow for the investigation of these reversals in the asymmetry. Cases I and III appear to be the most conducive to full cooperation (convergence to equilibrium (1; 1) ). Case II may generate a partially cooperative state of the form ( 1 ; 0); 1 > 0, whereas case IV appears as the most detrimental co-evolution of reciprocators, with both populations converging to the AllD state. Note, however, that even in this worst case scenario a positive outcome may still be reached by pushing up the probability of continued interaction w, as can be seen in Figure 6b . 
Conclusions
Reciprocity is a key mechanism in inducing cooperation in asymmetric two-player repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games and may therefore provide a possible way-out of the problems in international environmental negotiations such as the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. In this paper we use a typical model for International Environmental Agreements but analyze a di¤erent institutional setting where countries may use reciprocal trigger strategies instead of trying to reach a unanimous agreement. Since a large number of countries is involved and countries are not identical, we had to extend the basic theory to more than two players and to asymmetries in bene…ts and costs and in the thresholds of the trigger strategies.
Basically we investigated whether in a population of countries that consists of reciprocators and unconditional defectors the fraction of reciprocators can grow because they are successful, so that cooperation will increase. We focused on the case with two types of countries: the …rst type has high emissions and high costs of emission reductions and the other type has low emissions and low costs of emission reductions. Groups of countries are randomly drawn from the population and interact in a n-player repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. Successful strategies are imitated in replicator dynamics and in this way the fraction of reciprocators may increase but may also decrease. Our results show that there exist regions in the parameter space such that (partial) cooperation may emerge as the long-run attractor of an evolutionary selection process. We show that full cooperative behavior may be sustained if there exists a critical mass of initial cooperators, if the thresholds for the trigger strategies are high and if the duration of the repeated interaction is su¢ ciently long.
In the context of the Conference of the Parties on climate change, it may help if countries switch to "conditioning" behavior when pledging a certain fraction of emission reductions, instead of trying to reach a unanimous agreement. An example is the European Union strategy of stepping up to a 30% emission reduction provided that other developed countries match this contribution and developing countries take "appropriate" actions. Numerical simulations of our model suggest that, in the highly asymmetric context of the climate game, this strategy may be successful provided that developed and developing countries are willing to make similar pledges and provided that they are interacting repeatedly and initiating this process with a su¢ ciently large group of countries.
Figure (1) shows that the space (k; l) can be split in three payo¤-equivalent regions that we denote by R 1 ; R 2 ; R 3 . We …rst compute T F T i 1 ; 1 ; AllD i and i for each region.
A.1 R 1 f(k; l); k 2 ; l 2 g
In region 1, both types I; J start with and continue cooperation C. For type I, the expected net bene…t of the T F T strategy is
whereas the AllD strategy yields AllD i we can preserve both lower bounds of the summation operators as long as we adjust for the bordercase 2 payo¤s at (k = 2 ) and (l = 2 ):
Finally, by using the expressions for V (C i j k + 1 j l); V (D i j k j l) and V (D i j k j 0), we obtain region 1's payo¤ di¤erence: +B 1 ( 2 )B 2 ( 2 )( wb 2 n );
where I 1 ( ; ); I 2 ( ; ) stand for the regularized incomplete beta functions 3 .
2 We assume that type j player continues to cooperate unless both k = 2 and l = 2 hold. This assumption is not innocuous as a more stringent strategy (i.e. start cooperate and revert to perpetual defection if either k = 2 or l = 2 ) would lead to a di¤erent payo¤ structure for the AllD strategy. A similar assumption applies when the second corner point is hit: k = 1 and l = 1 :
3 The incomplete beta function is given by: B(x; a; b) = R B(a;b) : For a binomially distributed random variable X B(p; n) the regularized beta function I characterizes the cumulative probability distribution, i.e. P (X ) = I 1 p (n ; +1) = 1 I p ( +1; n ):
A.2 R 2 f(k; l); (k 1^l 1 )nR 1 g
In region 2, type I starts with and continues cooperation C, while type J starts with cooperation C but switches to defection D. The expected net bene…ts of a T F T strategy from population I are 2 T F T i
